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Abstract. In this paper we discuss how team configuration may influence how 
information is shared among team members for low-altitude Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) operations. NASA collected and analyzed observation data gath-
ered during a series of field tests for the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) pro-
ject. The field tests were part of a larger effort aimed at advancing the UTM con-
cept, conducted at six test-sites spread across the USA. Ground control station 
(GCS) concepts, flight-crew composition, and crew-size varied within and across 
test-sites. Flight crews took two strategic approaches to organizing their teams. 
The first of the two approaches was implemented by one third of the flight crews. 
These crews integrated the role of UTM operator into the duties of existing crew 
members, merging the current roles with this new one, keeping the UTM Opera-
tor collocated with the flight crew. The remaining two thirds implemented a dis-
tributed team configuration, where a single UTM operator distributed support 
across multiple crews. Results from our data collection efforts revealed that UTM 
Operator location influenced whether flight crews used verbal communication 
versus displays to acquire UTM information. 
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1 Introduction 
The focus of this paper is on the impact of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) crew con-
figuration on how information pertinent to a crew’s objectives is used and accessed. 
These crews operate unmanned aircraft (UA) for diverse applications. They may fly the 
aircraft manually or provide high level direction if the aircraft is autonomous. We ex-
pect that most UA traffic will be autonomous because the quantity of aircraft – partic-
ularly for major commercial operations – will exceed the human operator’s bandwidth 
for actively managing the flights. By 2035, these commercial operations will comprise 
more than half of the projected 250,000 concurrent UAS operations [1]. The overall 
UA fleet size is forecast to be 35 times the number of manned aircraft currently in op-
eration. To meet this expected demand, NASA is currently working with academic and 
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industry partners to develop a concept for a UAS Traffic Management (UTM) ecosys-
tem [2]. The UTM system will manage traffic for unmanned aircraft that are less than 
50 lbs, and only for operations occupying airspace up to 500 ft in altitude. At the center 
of this ecosystem is an information exchange system that allocates active management 
of aircraft to automation and provides services to UAS operators for coordinating 
shared access to airspace [3]. In a series of four flight test campaigns NASA will ob-
serve and analyze how UAS operators incorporate UTM tasks, displays, and tools with 
their crews [4]. These four campaigns will be supported by four distinguishable tech-
nical capability levels (TCL). 
1.1 Flight Test Campaigns 
The TCLs build on each other and will include tests that grow in complexity. TCL 1 
and 2 have already been completed. TCL 1 was limited to operations within visual line 
of sight and no more than 2 concurrent operations. It served to test very basic UTM 
functionality, which included vetting proposed flights for lateral conflicts with active 
operations and pre-defined constraints such as airports. In TCL 2, beyond visual line of 
sight (BVLOS) operations were introduced, along with enhancements such as alerting 
for airspace intrusion and segmented flight planning, that vetted operations for both 
lateral and vertical conflicts so that concurrent airspace reservations can be stacked by 
altitude.  TCL 3 and 4 will be conducted within two years from the publishing of this 
paper. They will include operations over increasingly populated areas, between moder-
ate and high UAS traffic densities, interactions between manned and unmanned opera-
tions, as well as large-scale contingency management. For a more detailed discussion 
of the flight campaigns and TCLs see Johnson, et al. [4], and for a more detailed dis-
cussion of NASA's concept of operation see Kopardekar, et al. [2]. The findings re-
ported in this paper will focus on the most recent test - TCL 2. 
In TCL 2, displays that provided information about the availability of mission air-
space and information about where their aircraft were relative to operational bounda-
ries, as well as other air traffic were introduced. How information was accessed de-
pended on the configuration of the flight crew. This configuration was influenced by 
the role of the crew member responsible for UTM tasks and how she coordinated with 
the rest of the crew to disseminate UTM information for achieving mission objectives. 
In the next section we stage our analysis of the UTM crew with a brief discussion about 
teams and point to distinct features necessary for them to function.  
1.2 Share Cognition and Situation Awareness 
In this document, we define teams to be UAS ground control station crews composed 
of two or more individuals who have distinguishable roles, but who are interacting in-
terdependently to achieve a common objective [5]. Endsley [6] points out 3 major fea-
tures of teams from this definition. The first is that team members share common ob-
jectives. Second, team members have specific role, and, third, the members are inter-
dependent. Commonly, functional teams will collectively form a construct called 
shared cognition [7]. Shared cognition develops when team members share four spe-
cific types of information through effective communication and coordination: (1) 
knowledge about a task, (2) knowledge of processes pertaining to a task, (3) knowledge 
about team members, and (4) their attitudes or beliefs [7]. Acquisition of the aforemen-
tioned types of knowledge allow the formation of mental models that are shared be-
tween members of a team. These models are important because individuals can then 
anticipate appropriate action in advance of verbal approval from others – particularly 
during periods of high workload.  
As long as the appropriate types of information are being propagated, effective teams 
need only share enough information to reach a common understanding. Endsley and 
Jones [6] use the term shared SA to refer to information that is actually shared among 
team members. For UTM, this information includes an aircraft’s position relative to its 
operational boundary and surface obstructions. The purpose of shared SA is to achieve 
team SA. The key difference here is that team SA is achieved when team members 
share an understanding that is an accurate reflection of the relevant events and system(s) 
in the environment. It is not always the case that shared SA leads to team SA. For ex-
ample, a UA ground control station operator monitoring a display may concur with a 
visual observer who is also tracking an aircraft in the sky that there is enough fuel ca-
pacity to complete a mission, but both team members may neglect to identify changing 
wind conditions that would accelerate the burn rate on the fuel cell, effectively requiring 
the aircraft to return sooner than planned. In this paper, we focus on how shared SA 
was achieved as a function of the UAS team (i.e., flight crew) configuration, and now 
turn to a description of the flight test environment in which these teams operated before 
discussing results from our data collection efforts. 
2 Method 
A series of flight tests were conducted at six different sites located across the USA, 
during May and June of 2017.  The campaign resulted in over 240 data collection 
flights.  Flights not only varied in duration, but also in the environments and terrains 
over which they flew.  The flight tests highlighted beyond visual line of sight and alti-
tude-stratified operations. Scenarios were developed independently by each test-site to 
demonstrate the UTM capabilities that they had proposed, and were required to include 
some combination of BVLOS, altitude stratification and multiple vehicles in the air.  
Some test-sites created one scenario with a series of variations to capture these capabil-
ities, while other test-sites constructed a number of unique scenarios.  Test sites re-
viewed and modified their scenarios in one or more shakedown days, that commonly 
included equipment testing (e.g., testing connectivity with UTM), while data-collection 
days focused on completing flights meant to satisfy the test scenarios. More detailed 
numbers regarding how these flight activities were distributed over the six test-sites are 
available in Martin, et al. [8]. 
2.1 Crew Roles and Responsibilities  
A total of 23 flight crews participated in the tests. Flight crews varied in number and 
affiliation: some had just two individuals, while others had approximately twelve in 
their crews. Flight crews from some test-sites were composed of individuals from one 
organization, while other test-sites’ crews had members from different organizations.  
Primary flight crew positions included those listed in Table 1 and additional positions 
staffed by some, if not all, of the flight test sites are listed in Table 2.  
 
Table 1. Crew member roles and responsibilities. 
Crew Role Crew Responsibilities 
Pilot-In-Command (PIC) Served as the main pilot for the vehicle 
GCS Operator (GCSO) Worked the vehicle’s flight planning and 
flight execution software 
USS Operator (USS Op) Monitored and interact with USS displays (& 
NASA) 
Launch and Software Flight Engineers Supported specific technical aspects of the 
vehicle 
Visual observers (VO) Safety monitors who provided visual contact 
with the vehicles at all times 
 
Table 2. Test site support personnel roles and responsibilities. 
Support Role Support Responsibilities 
UTM Manager Ensured the USS software was running and under-
took troubleshooting when needed 
Radio control (RC) Safety Pilots Served as alternate pilots if the PIC needed assistance 
Flight Test Manager Coordinated the crews and flights to conduct the test 
scenarios properly 
NASA researchers & Observers Collected observational and survey data, observers 
were available to support media day and answer flight 
team questions  
2.2 Crew Configuration 
Although each test-site created their own crew configurations, two types of team or-
ganization emerged with respect to UTM – integrated and distributed.  In integrated 
teams, organization included having the USS Op role (Table 1) as a dedicated member 
of the flight crew, either completing USS client management tasks alone, or by having 
one crew member splitting the USS Op role with another role (e.g., at Test-Site 3 the 
flight crew consisted of two people: a GCSO/PIC/USS Op and a safety pilot/launch 
engineer).  The advantages of having the USS Op role within a flight crew team was 
that this person was able to focus completely on the crew’s mission and communica-
tions were reduced.  The cost was the number of additional personnel, or, if the role 
was timeshared by one team member, that periods of high workload were compounded 
if all roles were busy at the same time, (e.g., at take-off and landing).   
In distributed teams, a dedicated USS Op fulfilled this role for a number of crews 
(e.g., at Test-Site 1, one USS Op submitted and managed the flight volumes for four 
flight crews, where each flight crew consisted of a PIC, a GCSO, and a launch engi-
neer).  Three test-sites took this “hub-&-spoke” approach – Test-Sites 1, 4 and 5.  The 
advantage of separating out the USS Op role was that this person became a specialist 
and overall required manpower was reduced.  The cost was the increase in communi-
cations load, as the USS Op had to stay in contact with all the flight crews s/he was 
serving, and the workload related to managing multiple flights in the case that one flight 
crew/vehicle was having an off-nominal event.   
2.3 Tools and Displays 
Equipment available at each Ground Control Station (GCS) location varied widely 
across (and sometimes within) test-sites.  At most GCSs, several displays were availa-
ble to the flight crews to give them information about their vehicle’s flight, and some 
also included displays to show surrounding operations, and/or aspects of the UTM sys-
tem.  For example, Test-Site 3 provided four screens for its GCSO/PIC/USS Op.  These 
individuals were not in line of sight (LOS) of their vehicle.  Standard tools shown on 
their displays were flight planning/execution software, a USS client, and a fusion of 
radar, multi-lateration systems and GCS telemetry.  The fourth screen was available to 
show other information of the GCSO/PIC/USS Op’s choice, including weather, vehicle 
and USS data, radio frequency usage, etc.  Other test-sites, which had more mobile/port-
able GCSs, used fewer displays.  At Test-Site 5, for example, flight crews had a hand-
held controller, and one display showing the autopilot software for their vehicle.  These 
flight crews did not have access to a display of UTM information.  Instead, UTM in-
formation was verbally relayed to them by radio from a centralized location, where the 
USS Op had such a display.   
All test-sites used at least one surveillance system to provide information about the 
airspace not provided by vehicles’ on-board sensors (GPS, ADS-B), helping to identify 
other manned and unmanned aircraft flying near the test-site.  A NASA-built iOS ap-
plication called insight UTM (iUTM), provided visualizations of UTM system infor-
mation and current operations, and was made available to the test-sites.  Test-Sites 3 
and 5 elected to use iUTM as an additional situation awareness display. To participate 
in these tests, participants needed to have certain basic capabilities, but the manner and 
extent by which the partners met those requirements differed. These differences are not 
examined in this paper.   
2.4 Procedure 
During test days, teams of two researchers collected data from the participants at each 
test-site about their experiences.  To the extent possible, researchers observed all flight 
crews at some point across the test days.  Data were collected in a number of ways:  
• observations of participants during flights,  
• questionnaires administered at the end of the day,  
• interviews conducted at the end of the day.   
All of these methods solicited feedback on how flight crews used information and 
where they looked for it.  In total, 18 end-of-day group interviews were collected across 
the six test sites, totaling nearly nine hours of recording.  Survey items were presented 
to the participants in the context of the research objectives of the test-site’s test scenar-
ios.  Approximately 40 questions were generated in the flight test survey, but conditions 
were set so that participants only answered around 15 at any one time.  There were only 
three or four questions in each shakedown survey.  Most questions used a seven-point 
rating format, but some were multiple choice or open-ended.   
3 Results 
Recurring themes that surfaced from field observations convey how information was 
shared as a function of crew configuration. 
3.1 Sources of Information  
As the USS interface provides an additional set of information to the crew, team mem-
bers were asked both before and during flight tests about the source of information they 
used.  Between a shakedown questionnaire and an end of day survey, participants were 
asked five questions about where they looked during flights to gain information about 
their vehicle.  Numbers of responses varied from 24 to 45 to the end of day survey and 
were 19 for the shakedown survey. 
 
Fig. 1. Percentage of reported usage of infor-
mation sources by crew configuration before 
flight test participation. 
 
Fig. 2. Percentage of reported usage of infor-
mation sources by crew configuration after 
flight test participation. 
   
Before taking part in the flight test, respondents estimated that they would look to 
other personnel (e.g., the GCSO or the USS Op) three quarters of the time (Figure 1) 
and look at displays about 25% of the time to gather information about their own vehi-
cle, with talking via radio being the most frequently chosen option (n=14)1.  Most re-
spondents reported seeking vehicle information from more than one source.   Both in-
tegrated and distributed crews report primarily using radio comms (around 20% of the 
                                                        
1 Note that the question options were uneven, as six personnel roles were listed but only three 
displays. 
time) and line of sight (17%) to gain information about their vehicle.  They did report 
using tools (e.g., USS client) to gather information, but to a lesser extent than relying 
on reports from other people.  Their responses were very similar for where they would 
gather information about other vehicles flying in the area. Before taking part in the 
flight test, respondents estimated that they would look to other personnel for infor-
mation 63% of the time and look at displays about 19% of the time, with talking via 
radio, again, being the most frequently chosen option (n=14)2.     
After days when they had flown BVLOS missions, participants were asked a ques-
tion similar to that above.  Most respondents, again, reported looking at more than one 
source of information to keep track of their vehicle when it was BVLOS.  Three sources 
of information stood out as most frequently used.  About 27% of the time, respondents 
looked at their ground station display and talked to their VO to gather vehicle position 
information (Figure 2).  The USS client display was the third most popular source of 
information, chosen 23 out of 135 times (17%).  Integrated crews reported going to a 
tool most often to find information about their vehicle, while distributed crews reported 
they primarily talked to their VO to gain information.   
There are two encouraging aspects to the differences between participants’ answers 
before the flight tests and after.  The first is that usage of the USS client increased, 
between shakedowns and post-flight data collection.  The percentage of the time par-
ticipants said they had looked at USS client information more than doubled from just 
over 7% to just over 17%.   The second, is a focusing of where participants looked for 
information (which is not readily shown in Figures 1 and 2) from an average of just 
under four sources (3.8) to fewer than three (2.5). 
  
Participants were asked the same 
question again in the context of acquir-
ing information for altitude-stratified 
flights.  Again, most respondents re-
ported looking at more than one source 
of information to keep track of relative 
aircraft positions when their flight was 
altitude-stratified with another. On av-
erage, participants reported looking at 
three sources of information.  Inte-
grated crews looked at their GCS dis-
play, the USS client display and talked 
to their VO most often (Figure 3).  Dis-
tributed crews looked at their USS cli-
ent display, their GCS, and into the airspace.   In Figure 3, the slight difference between 
crews of different organizations, seen in Figure 2, is more marked, with distributed 
crews shifting to look at their tools a little more.  However, this could be a result of the 
conditions at the time or the exact nature of the flight. 
                                                        
2 Note that the question options were uneven, as six personnel roles were listed but only two 
displays. 
Fig. 3. Percentage of reported source usage to ob-
tain information about altitude stratified flights, by 
crew configuration. 
3.2 Finding and Using Information 
When asked questions about the process of finding information rather than the source 
of data, half of the respondents (16 of 32) reported they were “easily” able to find all 
the information they needed to support their decisions3.  Integrated crews seemed to 
find the information they needed more easily, with two thirds reporting they could “eas-
ily find all the information they needed” as opposed to only forty percent of distributed 
crew personnel.   
Ease of finding information plays into how hard crews have to work to achieve their 
tasks.  On average, participants reported their workload as “medium” (m = 4.16 out of 
7), with participants from integrated crews feeling they were more loaded (m = 4.8) 
than participants from distributed crews (m = 3.8) (Figure 4).  It is possible that inte-
grated crews would have a higher load at busier times because the USS Operator was 
often not an additional person in the team.  The USS Op roles had been integrated with 
other team roles, and were either allocated across the group or were an additional set of 
tasks for one team member.  For distributed crews, the USS Op role was filled by an 
additional person, who was not located with the team.  Under nominal conditions, the 
crew would not be aware of any additional UTM activity.  However, for this series of 
flight tests, the case where multiple vehicles simultaneously had off nominal events was 
not tested, and it is hypothesized that distributed crews may experience higher workload 
or a lower awareness of local operations under these conditions. 
Participants were also asked to 
rate how their level of attention 
changed when there were multi-
ple vehicles flying.  Integrated 
crew members reported their 
level of attention changed and 
they “increased their vigilance” 
(m = 5.8 out of 7) (Fig. 4).  Dis-
tributed crew members also in-
creased their vigilance “a little” 
(m = 5.3), but not as much as in-
tegrated crew-members.   When 
there were multivehicle opera-
tions, and some of these vehicles 
were out of the line of sight for the team on the ground, distributed team members may 
have had less awareness for these other vehicles if they did not make an effort to check 
in with their USS Op.  Respondents often said that they gathered information from other 
people rather than displays, e.g., “all information was provided by my eyes, crew and 
OC radio calls” (Test-Site 2 participant).  Initially, crews intended to look for the po-
tential locations of other vehicles during their flight planning, whereas, while their ve-
hicle was airborne, they intended to only seek out information about other flights if they 
could see and/or hear this other vehicle in the vicinity.  However, participants reported 
                                                        
3 9% of respondents reported they had no display, however, absence of a visual display does not 
mean that the participant received no information, as many flight crews were designed to re-
ceive information via voice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Mean level of workload and level of attention, 
shown by crew organization. 
they, in fact, took a slightly different approach, where close to 30% of the time they had 
looked for other vehicles on their displays “all the time”.  Integrated crews reported 
using their displays at some level 75% of the time and distributed crews reported using 
their displays at some level 38% of the time to gain information about other vehicles.   
This affected their use of their USS client, a third of the time participants reported look-
ing at the USS displays themselves, and the other two thirds of the time they asked the 
USS Operator to report the USS client information to them.  It should be noted that this 
depended on a participant’s role in the flight crew – whether they were reporting or 
being reported to.  However, discussions highlighted that additional verbal communi-
cations were required when the UTM Op was remote from the rest of the crew.  A small 
difference between integrated and distributed crews, that illustrates how the team work-
flow was different between the two crew organizations, was that 20% of the time, dis-
tributed crews reported only gaining USS client information when there was an alert, 
whereas integrated crews reported that they “always during concurrent operations,” or 
“always,” looked at their USS client.  This reflects the greater availability of UTM in-
formation in integrated crews.   
In debriefs, operators were also asked about information that they would want to 
gain from their displays/ tools and their team about their own flight and others.  From 
the debrief transcriptions (see [8] for more information).  Crews noted they wanted to 
be able to see immediately all aspects of their vehicle health, performance, and location. 
They also wanted to be able to find out location and health information about other 
flights in their vicinity.  They were interested in receiving alerts about issues with their 
own vehicles and with others, and some suggested that they wanted their USS to suggest 
courses of action, give an account of why issues arise, or how crews might recover from 
a situation.  However, this is a substantial quantity of information, and crews noted 
occasions during the flight tests when they experienced both visual and aural clutter 
from their displays.  There were concerns that too much data was available and that 
crews could not pay attention to all of it without being distracted.  Although the amount 
of information that a crew was able to attend to depended to some extent on the size of 
the team, the debrief and observation comments suggest that information needs to be 
carefully prioritized and then layered within tools to ensure that the most pertinent in-
formation is the most readily available, but all information can be obtained if needed. 
Crews were keen to share as much information as possible with support personnel, 
or “home base,” suggesting streaming raw data from their vehicle to these locations.  
They noted that consistency/standardization of information and formatting on a USS 
GUI (graphical user interface) is also needed for these remote personnel (including the 
USS Operator when teams are distributed and s/he is managing a number of flights from 
a distant location) to be able to compare across, and understand multiple flights.  The 
information that operators felt they should broadcast to others concerned off nominal 
vehicle states rather than nominal data.  Operators stated that a USS needs to report out, 
off-nominal events occurring with a user’s own operation, such as non-conforming or 
rogue states, lost links, return-to-base (RTB), and RTB procedures or intent. However, 
interviewees emphasized that the community needs to agree on the terminology for 
each of the states that is broadcast.  Another point crews made about broadcasting off 
nominal states is that the crews themselves cannot be required to send these messages, 
they will be too busy managing the event.  This suggests that off nominal information 
broadcasts through USS clients will need to be automatically triggered.   
4 Discussion 
In this paper we reported on data collection efforts from UTM flight tests. Observation 
data, surveys, and interviews point to at least an informal conclusion that crew config-
uration guides how UAS flight crews share information. Principle devices for infor-
mation acquisition about UTM events came from either displays or requested verbally 
from a UTM operator. Overall, when crews were integrated, they turned to displays for 
UTM information, while distributed groups preferred verbal communication. Mean 
rated workload for integrated crews were higher than for distributed crews. This differ-
ence may have been due to integrated crews having to burden a single individual with 
both UTM responsibilities and existing ground station activities. In contrast, the UTM 
operator was a standalone individual in distributed crews, who did not have a dual role.  
To facilitate safe and efficient operations, flight crews needed fast access to easily 
understandable information about the current mission, nearby operations, and the sur-
rounding environment. As noted above, some feedback suggested it was not a lack of 
information but that crews sometimes struggled to extract the information they needed 
from the displays they used in the flight tests – information was buried too deeply in 
the tool given the time available and other activities occurring, or messages were diffi-
cult to interpret. Ease of information access will likely have the most impact on shared 
SA for integrated crews, based on our results. 
Some information participants said they just did not need, although opinion was 
divided on this. When the information displayed was perceived as unreliable, its use-
fulness was diminished as operators lost trust and sought out alternate information 
sources. For example, observers at different sites noted instances of multiple sources 
for position data showing conflicting information at the same time.   Crews considered 
not just what information they would like to receive but also how it is presented.  Many 
teams liked audio presentation of messages, emphasizing simple wording and that audio 
presentation should be used selectively.  They also noted that the environmental condi-
tions in the field sometimes make visual displays challenging to use. The mode in which 
information is propagated will likely play the largest role in shared SA for distributed 
teams. In lieu of the UTM Operator being present, verbal communication might have a 
positive effect on trust and reliance of the information shared – particularly where ver-
bal communication suggests that the shared information has been vetted by another 
human. 
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